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INTRODUCTION
The University of Oklahoma gave its quarterback, Baker Mayfield,1 a
full scholarship2 covering tuition, books, and room and board, as well as
an additional scholarship covering the full cost of attendance, which added
up to $140,000 over the span of four years.3 Suppose, however, the
Copyright 2019, by CHRISTINE COLWELL.
1. Baker Mayfield, U. OKLA. ATHLETICS, http://www.soonersports.com/
ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209397188 [https://perma.cc/UV9N-SQAJ] (last
visited Feb. 7, 2019).
2. A full scholarship the University of Oklahoma amounts to roughly
$30,000 an academic year. Bursar Services, U. OKLA., http://www.ou.edu/bursar
/tuition_fees.html [https://perma.cc/Z2KD-YT3Y] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
This figure includes cost of tuition and fees for a non-resident student and an
estimate of the amount needed for room, board, and books. Id.
3. The full cost of attendance is “calculated by an institutional financial aid
office, using federal regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees,
room and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other expenses related to
attendance at the institution.” Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA:
Preserving Amateurism in College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player
Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 873 (2016). The full cost of attendance is
currently awarded only to student-athletes at Division I institutions. Division I
institutions can elect to award scholarships up to $5,000 per year to each
individual athlete to cover the full cost of attendance but do not have to award the
maximum amount. Id. The $140,000 total includes the $30,000 award for tuition
as well as the $5,000 cost of attendance award calculated for four years.
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University owed an additional amount to Mayfield for being an employee
of the University of Oklahoma—a minimum wage of $7.254 an hour.
Hypothetically, this would mean that Mayfield would receive $44,000 in
total compensation for the academic year, not including potential overtime
pay.5 Mayfield would also receive tutoring, gear, and other benefits6 as a
result of his classification as an employee of the University.7 This is the
economic situation with which schools would be faced if student-athletes
were classified as employees of their universities. In addition to the great
financial burden on universities, scholars8 believe that allowing college
athletes to be classified as employees would “diminish[] the value of an
education,” and would shift student-athletes’ focus toward receiving
compensation and away from attaining a college degree.9 Additionally,

4. Oklahoma Minimum Wage 2017-2018, MINIMUMWAGE.ORG, https://
www.minimum-wage.org/oklahoma [https://perma.cc/XE97-BYJZ] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019).
5. This figure estimates the amount of minimum wage earned at $7.25 an
hour based on working 40 hours a week during a 30-week academic calendar year.
Any overtime earned would be based on any hours worked over 40 hours in a
week. Academic Calendar, U. OKLA. (Jan. 8, 2018, 9:06 AM), http://www.ou.edu
/admissions/academic_calendar/fall-2017 [https://perma.cc/SK7U-QPJ2]. Overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) is pay for any work over
40 hours in a work week and must be at least time and a half of the employee’s
regular pay rate. Wage and Hour Division, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.
dol.gov/whd/overtime_pay.htm [https://perma.cc/C63G-PFUR] (last visited Feb.
7, 2019).
6. See sources supra note 5.
7. See generally Paul Daugherty, College athletes already have advantages and
shouldn’t be paid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 20, 2012), https://www.si.com/moresports/2012/01/20/no-pay [https://perma.cc/8PKN-JPL9].
8. See, e.g., Ekow N. Yankah, Why N.C.A.A. Athletes Shouldn’t be Paid, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/sports/sporting-scene/whyncaa-athletes-shouldnt-be-paid [https://perma.cc/9HZS-EQAX]; Kristi Dosh, The
Problems with Paying College Athletes, FORBES (June 9, 2011), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/the-problems-with-paying-college-athletes/#6
d8cc4ce5f7c [https://perma.cc/6BAH-R6QA]; Malcolm Lemmons, College
Athletes Getting Paid? Here are Some Pros and Cons, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
29, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ college-athletes-getting-paidhere-are-some-pros-cons_us_58cfcee0e4b07112b6472f9a [https://perma.cc/JJY6
-UQNW].
9. Daugherty, supra note 7. Sixty-nine percent of the public oppose paying
college athletes more money than they already receive to cover their college
expenses. Jon Solomon, NCAA expert: 69 percent of public opposes paying college
players, CBS SPORTS (June 25, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-

902

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

industry professionals argue that the compensation of student-athletes
would change the spirit of college sports10—the Saturday tailgates, March
Madness, longtime traditions, and customs of collegiate athletics that have
been in place for years would fade away.11 Paying student-athletes as
employees would destroy the collegiate model that has been in place for
decades.12
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) governs and
enforces the mandatory regulations for student-athletes.13 The NCAA
principle of amateurism prohibits student-athletes from receiving any
compensation beyond academic or athletic scholarships.14 In 2016, a group
of student-athletes brought suit, challenging NCAA amateurism and
claiming to be employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).15
In Berger v. NCAA, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA and therefore
are not entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay.16 Judge Hamilton’s
concurrence questioned the majority’s holding as applied to Division I
athletes in revenue-generating sports, suggesting that student-athletes

football/news/ncaa-expert-69-percent-of-public-opposes-paying-college-players/
[https://perma.cc/C54L-Q6Q8].
10. Sara Ganim, Paying college athletes would hurt traditions, NCAA chief
Emmert testifies, CNN (June 19, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/19/us/ncaaobannon-lawsuit-trial/index.html [https://perma.cc/V732-JZYA].
11. Id.
12. “[F]our out of 10 people are less likely to watch or attend college games”
if college athletes are compensated. Solomon, supra note 9. NCAA President
Mark Emmert explains that the customs of college sports, such as the
“camaraderie of game day, the tailgating, the atmosphere of a stadium packed
with nearly 100,000 fans and the pride of cheering for a university team,” could
all go away if we get rid of NCAA amateurism policies and pay student-athletes
as employees. Ganim, supra note 10.
13. Division I Governance, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance?divi
sion=d1 [https://perma.cc/6WDS-QB6Z] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); see also Scott
A. Mitchell, Hit, Sacked, and Dunked by the Courts: The Need for Due Process
Protection of the Student-Athlete in Intercollegiate Athletics, 19 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 733, 736 (1994).
14. Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism [https://perma.cc
/VK7V-W4M5] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
15. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir.
2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401,
403 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
16. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290.
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should be employees.17 Berger alone creates uncertainty as to whether
student-athletes are employees under the FLSA and whether courts can
reconcile an employee classification with the NCAA amateurism rules.
This Comment proposes that student-athletes of revenue-generating
sports are not employees under the FLSA and should not receive minimum
wage or overtime pay from schools. Recognizing student-athletes as
employees creates serious issues for schools, such as the requirement to
pay student-athletes minimum wage, compliance with Title IX,18 and
challenges calculating which student-athletes should receive compensation
and for which activities. A feasible solution to this predicament is to amend
the NCAA amateurism rules to allow student-athletes to profit from outside
revenue sources and endorsements.19 Student-athletes would be “selfemployed” once they commit to an institution and would generate revenue
on their own behalves.20 Allowing student-athletes to benefit from
endorsements ameliorates problems associated with classifying studentathletes as employees.21 Additionally, permitting student-athletes to profit
from their generated revenue would decrease litigation, provide clarity in
17. NCAA Division I institutions are required to sponsor a certain amount of
sports, award financial grants to student-athletes, and follow the rules set out in
the NCAA Division I Manual. Rohith A. Parasuraman, Unionizing NCAA
Division I Athletics: A Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 733 (2007); Berger,
843 F.3d at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
18. Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 requires institutions
receiving federal funding to provide equal opportunities and funding to males and
females. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). Failure to comply with Title IX can result in
the Office of Civil Rights pulling federal funding from a school. Id. If studentathletes were employees, both males and females would have to be paid the same
minimum wage and have the opportunity to earn pay for the same number of
hours. Id. See also Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and
Historical Review of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law,
22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 326 (2012); see infra Part IV.C.
19. This Comment proposes amending the NCAA amateurism policies to
allow student-athletes to receive endorsements, but not create a free-market
situation in which players are recruited and paid their fair market value to attend
a university as is currently proposed in Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
No. 14-cv-02758-CW (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014).
20. Self-employed in this context analogizes student-athletes to “independent
and thriving contractors [and] small business owners.” Jayesh M. Rathod &
Michal Skapski, Reimagining the Law of Self-Employment: A Comparative
Perspective, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 159, 159 (2013).
21. See generally Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept
Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics
Created by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating
Scheme, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371, 415 (2012).
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determining student-athletes’ employment status, and establish a modern
version of NCAA amateurism rules more in accord with the current state
of collegiate athletics.
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of FLSA and the
NCAA. Part II explains how the NCAA prohibits student-athletes’
classification as employees and analyzes the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) and workers’ compensation in relation to the NCAA
amateurism principles barring student-athletes’ employee status. Part II
also examines Berger v. NCAA and the uncertainty Judge Hamilton’s
concurrence creates regarding the applicability of the protections of the
FLSA to student-athletes. In addition, Part II addresses Dawson v. NCAA,
a more recent suit brought in the wake of Berger. Part III concludes that
under the “economic realities” test, student-athletes are not FLSA
employees. Finally, Part IV offers three potential solutions to decrease the
amount of litigation regarding the compensation of student-athletes. This
Comment argues specifically that the best solution to decrease litigation is
a revision of the NCAA amateurism policies, allowing student-athletes to
profit from endorsements and outside revenue sources.
I. MINIMUM WAGE FOR COLLEGE PLAY: THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT AND THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION
The FLSA dramatically altered the American worker’s life in 1938.22
Not only did the FLSA guarantee a minimum wage, but it also improved
working conditions for many people.23 Individuals who petition to be
covered employees24 under the FLSA can gain the benefits of employee
status that would not otherwise be afforded to them.25 Student-athletes are
unable to gain employment status under the FLSA because the NCAA
does not allow student-athletes to be classified as employees.26

22. Anna P. Prakash & Brittany B. Skemp, Beyond the Minimum Wage: How
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s Broad Social and Economic Protections Support
Its Application to Workers Who Earn A Substantial Income, 30 ABA J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 367, 368 (2015).
23. Id.
24. A “covered employee” under the FLSA must be paid federal minimum
wage and overtime rates for any work over 40 hours a week. Fact Sheet #14:
Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE
& HOUR DIVISION (July 2009), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/wh
dfs14.htm [https://perma.cc/XR6C-K47H].
25. Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368.
26. NCAA amateurism principles do not allow for student-athletes to be
employees of the school they attend. Amateurism, supra note 14.
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A. Minimum Wage and a Safer Workplace: History of the Fair Labor
Standards Act
The FLSA is a federal employment act Congress passed in 1938 that
regulates minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor
standards to ensure fair treatment of employees.27 The Act defines
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer in relation to an employee.”28 In an equally ambiguous fashion,
the Act defines an employee as “any individual employed by an
employer.”29 To qualify as an employee under the FLSA one must perform
work for an employer;30 the FLSA does not define “work,” however.31
Employees covered under the Act benefit from the assurance that they will
be paid a guaranteed minimum salary and reasonable hours.32
Federal Courts use various methods to determine if an individual is an
employee under the FLSA.33 Although there is no single test courts must

27. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368; Daniel
B. Abrahams et al., Introduction to The Fair Labor Standards Act, in EMPLOYER’S
GUIDE TO THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT 100 (1993). Under the FLSA,
employers must pay employees no less than the minimum wage, currently set at
$7.25 an hour. Id. Overtime must be paid at time-and-a-half of an employee’s
regular pay rate for hours worked beyond 40 hours in a seven-day work week. Id.
at 110. A covered employee under the FLSA is guaranteed a salary, a guaranteed
minimum for services performed, and reasonable work hours. Sherrie Scott, What
Are The Benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act?, CHRON, https://smallbus
iness.chron.com/benefits-fair-labor-standards-act-2957.html [https://perma.cc/7
GSK-WXSP] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).
29. Id. § 203(e)(1).
30. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir.
2016). This Comment uses the Meriam-Webster definition of “work”: an “activity
that a person engages in regularly to earn a livelihood.” Work, MERIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/work [https:
//perma.cc/4NDH-G2EB] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
31. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290.
32. Scott, supra note 27. “Prior to the FLSA’s enactment, working conditions
were deplorable” and employees “worked long hours in unsafe environments,”
“earn[ing] wages too small to secure even the most modest living standards.”
Prakash & Skemp, supra note 22, at 368.
33. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals uses a four-factor test to
guide courts, which asks “whether the alleged employer (1) had the power to hire
and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and
(4) maintained employment records.” Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency,
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apply,34 the Supreme Court “has instructed courts to construe the terms
‘employee’ and ‘employer’ expansively, [but with some] limits.”35 Courts
must assess the “totality of circumstances rather than on any technical
label.”36 This totality of circumstances analysis requires the courts to look
at the economic reality of the working relationship between employees and
employers.37 Conducting a totality-of-circumstances analysis allows
courts to consider whether the FLSA was intended to apply to a particular
relationship.38 Congress intended for some relationships, but not all, to be
characterized as “employment relationships” under the FLSA; it remains
unclear whether Congress had student-athletes in mind in enacting the
law.39 The United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) provides a list of
relationships it does not classify as employment relationships, such as
prison inmates, medical residents, and foster parents.40 If Congress had
intended to include all employment relationships, Congress would not
have produced a handbook detailing all of the relationships that are not
provided coverage under the FLSA.41
Although there is no rigid test, the “economic realities” test is the most
widely used and accepted method to determine whether there is an
economic relationship present; namely, it assesses whether an employer
intended an employment relationship with a particular worker.42 The DOL
704 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983). Courts may determine employee status as a
determination of the circumstances of the whole activity. Id.
34. Abrahams et al., supra note 27, at 240.
35. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S.
290, 295 (1985)).
36. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286.
37. Id. at 290.
38. Id. (citing Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992)).
39. See generally Jonathan L. Israel, Repeat After Me: College Athletes Are
Not School Employees Under the FLSA, NAT’L L. REV. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/repeat-after-me-college-athletes-are-not-schoolemployees-under-flsa [https://perma.cc/S5TR-2KGL].
40. See Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, Chapter 10 FLSA
Coverage: Employment Relationship, Statutory Exclusions, Geographical Limits,
U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch10.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z55B-J6K6].
41. See generally id.
42. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961);
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727 (1947); see generally
United States Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, Opinion Letter Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 2015 WL 4449086, at *1 (describing the economic
realities test that has developed as an alternative to the common law control test).
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enumerates guiding factors for courts to determine the “economic reality”
of the employment relationship: (1) the permanency of the relationship;
(2) the amount of the worker’s individual investment and employer’s
investment in facilities and equipment; (3) the opportunities for the worker
to experience profit and loss; (4) the worker’s skill and initiative; (5) the
degree of control by the employer; and (6) the extent to which the work is
an essential part of the employer’s business.43
The permanency or indefiniteness of a working relationship can
suggest that an employment relationship exists and can dictate when the
worker is an employee or an independent contractor.44 The more
permanent the relationship, the more likely there is an employment
relationship.45 The amount of work an individual invests in facilities,
equipment, and tools, compared to the amount an employer invests, may
also help determine whether an employment relationship exists.46 If an
individual personally invests in tools and equipment to complete a job, it
may signify that he is in business as an independent contractor and not an
employee of the employer.47 Courts normally consider an independent
contractor an employee if he has the ability to make managerial decisions
and experience the effects of those decisions on profits and losses, as
Although the common law control test was popular when drafting the FLSA,
Congress did not include the test in the statute. Since the drafting, courts have shifted
to applying the “economic realities” test. Id. “The U.S. Supreme Court has . . .
indicated that there is no single rule or test for determining whether an individual is
an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of the FLSA. The Court has
held that it is the total activity or situation which controls.” Fact Sheet #13:
Employment Relationship Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), U.S. DEP’T
LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIVISION (July 2008), https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D6N-ZHR6].
43. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see also Abrahams et al., supra note 27,
at 240. The factors are a guideline and are not required to be followed by courts
when analyzing an employment relationship. Id.
44. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. Independent contractors are not
employees, are economically independent, and are in business for themselves. Id.
See also Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1998)
(explaining that independent contractors often have fixed employment periods
whereas employees usually have a continuous and indefinite relationship with an
employer).
45. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
46. Id. See also Chao v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104,
107 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that cable installers who had to provide their own
trucks, specialized tools, uniforms, pagers, and automobile insurance were not
employees, rather independent contractors).
47. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
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opposed to a worker who does not make managerial decisions for a
business.48 An independent contractor demonstrates independent business
judgement and has specialized skills, granting him economic
independence from a putative employer.49 An independent contractor’s
specialized skills indicate that he is in business for himself, in contrast to
an employee working for an employer.50 The more control an employer
has over a worker—including the time and manner of the work to be
performed—helps the courts determine whether an employment
relationship exists.51 More control usually indicates the presence of an
employer–employee relationship.52 Likewise, a worker is ordinarily found
to be an employee if his performance or service is vital to the business’s
success.53 In contrast, an independent contractor provides temporary
services that do not generally impact a business’s overall profitability.54
In addition to the DOL’s suggested factors, courts have developed a
variety of multifactor tests to help with the “economic realities” analysis.55
The Seventh and Second Courts of Appeals have articulated factors that
are useful in determining the economic reality of employment
relationships.56 Other circuits—like the Ninth Circuit—have strayed away

48. Id. See also Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that cake decorators working at a bakery had no control over advertising, quality
of the work, quality of the cakes, ingredients in the cakes, and therefore no input
or control of any determinants of profits of the business).
49. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. Independent contractors are not
employees, are economically independent, and are in business for themselves. Id.
See also Herman v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675
(D. Md. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Chao, 16 F. App’x 104 (holding that cable installers
were independent contractors due to their highly specialized skills and trade,
similar to electricians and carpenters).
50. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
51. Id. See also Dole, 875 F.2d at 810 (finding that having no control over
decisions indicates a lack of an employment relationship).
52. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. One factor is not more indicative of an
employment relationship and all factors must be assessed. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also Brock v. Superior Care, Inc., 840 F.2d 1054, 1059 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that services provided by nurses constituted an integral part of the
business—to provide health care—finding that the nurses were employees).
55. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 2016).
56. Id. at 290 (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535–38
(7th Cir. 1987)). In Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, the secretary sought
declaration as a matter of law that migrant farm workers were employees of the
farm. The seven factors the court used in determining whether migrant laborers
were employees are: (1) the amount of control the landowner had over the migrant
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from any multifactor tests and have held that circumstances of the entire
activity must be considered when making the ultimate determination of
employee status.57 Each circuit is free to develop its own approach to
determine if an employment relationship exists based on circumstances
and factors that best fit best the factual situation.58
To further assist the courts in determining whether an employment
relationship exists, the DOL Field Operations Handbook (“FOH”)
provides “interpretations regarding the employment relationship required

workers; (2) the possibility for the migrant workers to receive profit and incur
losses; (3) the degree of skill required from each worker; (4) the amount of capital
the workers invested; (5) the permanency and duration of the relationship; (6)
whether the service of the migrant workers was an integral part of the business;
and (7) the economic dependence of the migrant workers on landowners.
Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1535–38. In Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, unpaid
interns brought a class action suit against the motion picture distributor claiming
compensation as employees. Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, 811 F.3d 528, 536–
37 (2d Cir. 2015). The court listed the following factors as a non-exhaustive list
to help determine if an intern is an employee: (1) the extent to which the intern
understands there is no expectation of compensation; (2) the extent to which the
internship provides training similar to what one would receive in an educational
setting; (3) the extent to which the internship is tied to the intern’s formal
education program and course work; (4) the extent to which the internship
accommodates the academic calendar; (5) the extent to which the internship’s
duration is limited to provide the intern with beneficial learning; (6) the extent to
which the intern’s work complements, rather than displaces, the work of paid
employees; and (7) the extent to which the intern and the employer understand
that the internship is conducted without promise of a paid job upon completion of
the internship. Berger, 843 F.3d at 290 (citing Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37). The
Second Circuit held that interns who brought a claim for employment status were
not employees; they participated knowing that they would not be paid, and the
internship was conducted primarily for educational and training purposes. Glatt,
811 F.3d at 536–37.
57. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405–06
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
58. See generally Dole v. Elliott Travel & Tours, Inc., 942 F.2d 962, 965 (6th
Cir. 1991); Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 194, 195 (5th Cir. 1983);
Carter v. Dutchess Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1984).

910

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

for the [FLSA] to apply.”59 The FOH60 provides that college students who
participate in extracurricular activities are not employees within the
meaning of the FLSA because the DOL considers collegiate athletics an
extracurricular activity in which participation is purely voluntary—an
activity that the FLSA intends to exclude.61 Thus, according to the DOL,
reasons unrelated to immediate compensation motivate participation in
athletics, and participation does not qualify as sufficient “work” to qualify
for minimum wage and overtime pay under the FLSA.62 The NCAA shares
the same view as the DOL and also agrees that student-athletes are not
employees under federal employment statutes.63
B. The National Collegiate Athletic Association and the Development of
Amateur Athletics
When evaluating the economic reality of the employment relationship,
courts must also consider the underlying policies of the NCAA controlling
student-athletes’ status as employees.64 The NCAA makes, enforces, and
interprets the rules preventing student-athlete compensation beyond any
academic or athletic scholarships.65 President Theodore Roosevelt
founded the NCAA in 1906 “to protect young people from the dangerous
and exploitive athletics practices of the time” and to regulate the rules and

59. Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, supra note 40. The
DOL guidelines and handbook assisted courts in determining whether studentathletes, interns, and prisoners were employees for FLSA purposes. See generally
Berger, 843 F.3d at 291; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 405–06; Schumann v. Collier
Anesthesia, P.A., 803 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2015); Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1992).
60. Department of Labor Field Operations Handbook, supra note 40.
61. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293.
62. Id. The majority decision in Berger looks at the DOL FOH as persuasive
authority and uses its interpretation to determine that student-athletes are not
employees under the act. Id.
63. See Donald Remy, NCAA Responds to union proposal, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-responds
-union-proposal [https://perma.cc/N6RL-7HDW] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
64. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293.
65. Remy, supra note 63.
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competition of intercollegiate football.66 Gradually, the NCAA expanded
its jurisdictional control to cover all intercollegiate athletic departments.67
The NCAA’s jurisdictional control allows the organization to act as
the governing body of member athletic departments and to enforce rules.68
Member institutions elect to be part of the NCAA, which allows
institutions to receive monetary support and guidance from NCAA, and to
propose regulations for all other member schools to adopt and follow.69
Once a regulation is adopted, the NCAA ensures the compliance of all
member institutions and departments.70 Noncompliance may result in
NCAA sanctions,71 such as limiting the number of athletic scholarships a
school can award or potentially banning coaches from coaching for a
substantial amount of time.72
The NCAA subdivides member institutions into three divisions—
Divisions I, II, and III73—based on the number of sports each school is
able to support financially.74 Division I schools have the largest athletic
66. Dan Treadway, Why does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6,
2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manziel-ncaaeligibility_b_3020985.html [https://perma.cc/JS6A-V4TM]; National Collegiate
Athletic Association, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/National-Collegiate-Athletic-Association [https://perma.cc/72UF-DVQ7]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
67. See generally Gordon S. White, N.C.A.A. Telecast Rights on Football
Struck Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09
/16/sports/ncaa-telecast-rights-on-football-struck-down.html [https://perma.cc/H
S8L-5H3Y] (explaining that the NCAA was operating as a “Classic Cartel” in the
operation of controlling the number of television appearances each collegiate
football team could participate in and the price for each appearance).
68. Division I Governance, supra note 13; see also Mitchell, supra note 13,
at 736.
69. Mitchell, supra note 13. See also What We Do, NCAA, http://www.nc
aa.org/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/6V4X-K3QQ] (last visited Feb. 7,
2019).
70. Id.
71. Infractions Phases and Parties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/de
fault/files/EnforcementHandout%20-%20Infractions%20Phases%20and%20Part
ies.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2XH-SCRK] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
72. Enforcement Process: Penalties, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/enforce
ment/enforcement-process-penalties [https://perma.cc/K6KT-T2P3] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019).
73. Katherine McClelland, Should College Football’s Currency Read “In
BCS We Trust” or Is It Just Monopoly Money?: Antitrust Implications of the Bowl
Championship Series, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 167, 171 (2004).
74. Terrill L. Johnson, The Antitrust Implications of the Divisional Structure
of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 8 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L.
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budgets, provide full athletic scholarships, and enroll the greatest number
of students.75 Division II schools may award only partial athletic
scholarships, and Division III schools may not award any athletic
scholarships.76 Additionally, each division is subject to specific rules
regulating the number of sports schools must sponsor and the amount and
type of financial aid the school may award.77 In exchange for giving up
discretion in awarding scholarships and relinquishing control over sports
in general, the NCAA provides support to its members.78
The NCAA’s current interpretation of its rules provides that no
employment relationship exists between student-athletes and the NCAA
or its member institutions.79 The NCAA’s principle of amateurism,80
therefore, prohibits student-athletes from receiving any type of salary for
REV. 97 (1991); Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivisional
Classification, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership/
divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification
[https://perma.cc/W3H P-3TX9] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
75. Recruiting Facts, NCAA (Mar. 2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/de
fault/files/Recruiting%20Fact%20Sheet%20WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK7MTLYM]. This Comment focuses on Division I schools because they produce the
most revenue and award the most athletic scholarships. See NCAA Finances, USA
TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/finances [https://perma.cc/XSV7-CU6
L] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
76. Parasuraman, supra note 17, at 733; Divisional Differences and the
History of Multidivisional Classification, supra note 74. Institutions classified as
Division I must be able to financially sponsor seven sports for men and seven
sports for women, two of those being team sports for each gender, and are allowed
to award full athletic scholarships. Id. Division II institutions must sponsor at least
five sports for men and five for women, with two team sports for each gender, and
may give partial athletic scholarships. Id. Division III institutions must sponsor
five sports for men and five for women, with two team sports for each gender, and
may not award any scholarships based on athletic ability. Id.
77. Divisional Differences and the History of Multidivisional Classification,
supra note 74.
78. Id. What is the NCAA?, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources
/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa [https://perma.cc/T8L4-8NFY] (last visited
Feb. 7, 2019). The NCAA provides monetary support, medical care, academic
support services, and training opportunities to student-athletes at member
institutions. What We Do, supra note 69.
79. Remy, supra note 63.
80. See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir.
2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401,
403 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (football player challenged the NCAA prohibition of paying
student-athletes as employees under the FLSA); see generally O’Bannon v.
NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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participating in a sport.81 If student-athletes receive any extra
compensation or benefits, they are ineligible to compete in NCAA
athletics.82 Amateurism83 is “a bedrock principle of college athletes and
the NCAA,”84 both ensuring that student-athletes focus on attaining a
quality education and preserving the idea that student-athletes do not play
for pay.85 The NCAA stresses that student-athletes are competing as
amateur athletes and are “students first, athletes second.”86 In light of the
current reality of the collegiate model,87 amateurism presents an area ripe
for litigation.88 To limit the potential litigation over compensation of

81. Amateurism, supra note 14. Student-athletes may receive athletic
scholarships, but may not be paid compensation similar to that which an employee
would receive. Id. Student-athletes may not receive any employee benefits. Id.
82. If a student-athlete is deemed ineligible, he is not allowed to compete in
any competitions for his respective school. Id.
83. See TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CARTEL: INSIDE THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NCAA 279 (2011); see also Joshua Senne, A Review of the NCAA’s Business
Model, Amateurism, and Paying the Players, SPORT J. (Jan. 8, 2018, 11:24 AM),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/a-review-of-the-ncaas-business-model-amateur
ism-and-paying-the-players/ [https://perma.cc/35D8-Q7DJ]; see also Marc
Edelman, How Young American Athletes Can Best Challenge a Bureaucracy that
Prevents them from Earning a Living, 9 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 135, 146 (2013).
84. Amateurism, supra note 14.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. “In the collegiate model of sports, the young men and women competing
on the field or court are students first, athletes second.” Id. The reality is that
student-athletes are now being treated as athletes first, and students second. See
generally Shane Battier, Let Athletes be Students, PLAYERS TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2017,
4:12 PM), https://www.theplayerstribune.com/shane-battier-ncaa-let-athletes-bestudents/ [https://perma.cc/JAT8-D759].
88. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053
(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016); see also Jenkins v. NCAA,
No. 14-cv-02758-CW (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (ongoing litigation seeking the
open-market recruitment of players and the ability to pay players what schools
think is appropriate for players name, image, and likeness). See also Livers v.
NCAA, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB (E.D. Penn. 2017) (a suit filed in October 2017 in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking the right of compensation under the
FLSA for scholarship athletes that involves specific schools who employ staff
such as trainers and coaches who “control” the student-athletes on scholarship and
create an employment relationship). See infra Part III.A; Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016); see also Dawson v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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student-athletes,89 the FLSA should not grant student-athletes employee
status. Rather, the NCAA Division I member institutions should revise the
NCAA amateurism policies to allow student-athletes compensation
through endorsement deals.
II. STUDENT-ATHLETES AS EMPLOYEES UNDER THE NLRA, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION, AND FLSA
Many litigants have challenged the student-athlete compensation
rules.90 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Berger v. NCAA, and Jenkins v. NCAA are the
most prominent cases placing the compensation of student-athletes at the
forefront.91 Notwithstanding the increasing number of cases brought to
challenge the status of student-athletes, courts hold consistently that
student-athletes are not employees under any legal standard, including
workers’ compensation, the NLRA, and the FLSA.92
A. Student-Athletes Not Considered Employees Under Employment
Statutes
The NCAA contends that student-athletes are not employees within
any definition of the NLRA.93 In 2014, the Northwestern University
football team petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to
unionize as employees under the NLRA.94 The players sought to establish
a collective bargaining agreement to regulate the “working” conditions
and benefits of their alleged employment.95 The NLRB chose not to assert
89. See supra discussion Part I.A.
90. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 at 1053; Jenkins, No. 14-cv-02758-CW;
Livers, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB; Berger, 843 F.3d at 294; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d
at 403.
91. See supra note 90.
92. Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000);
Berger, 843 F.3d at 294; Northwestern Univ., Employer & Collegiate Athletes
Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167, 2015 WL 4882656 (Aug. 17, 2015); see also
Adam Epstein & Paul M. Anderson, The Relationship Between a Collegiate
Student-Athlete and the University: An Historical and Legal Perspective, 26
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 287, 297 (2016).
93. See Remy, supra note 63; see also Michael H. LeRoy, Courts and the
Future of “Athletic Labor” in College Sports, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 507 (2015).
94. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656; Patrick C. Johnston,
Northwestern Football and College Athletes: Be Careful What You Wish For, 49
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 655, 660 (2015).
95. Northwestern players sought to establish a Collective Bargaining
Agreement through the players’ organization College Athletes Players
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jurisdiction in the matter, ultimately failing to address whether the players
were employees under the NLRA.96 Had the NLRB asserted jurisdiction
and considered the question of student-athletes employment status,
perhaps there would be more clarity as to why classifying student-athletes
as employees would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA and instead
would cause instability in labor relations.97

Association in which pay, health insurance, hours, and other conditions and
benefits associated with employment would be established in a contractual
agreement between the players and the university. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL
4882656. “Collective bargaining consists of negotiations between an employer
and a group of employees so as to determine the conditions of employment. The
result of collective bargaining procedures is a collective agreement. Employees
are often represented in bargaining by a union or other labor organization.”
Collective Bargaining, LEGAL INFO. INST. (Nov. 3, 2017, 4:20 PM),
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collectivebargaining bargaining [https://per
ma.cc/A4R5-NULR]. See generally Marc Edelman, The Future of College Athlete
Players Unions: Lessons Learned from Northwestern University and Potential
Next Steps in the College Athletes’ Rights Movement, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1627,
1635 (2017).
96. To collectively bargain, the Northwestern team had to bring a claim under
the NLRA and file it with the NLRB. The NLRB may refuse to assert jurisdiction
over a matter that would disturb the balance of labor practices. Ben Strauss,
N.L.R.B. Rejects Northwestern Football Players Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2017, 4:26 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/sports/ncaafootball/nlrbsays-northwestern-football-players-cannot-unionize.html [https://perma.cc/2VQ
3-BWK5]; Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656. The Regional Director for
Region 13 issued a decision in the case, finding that the University’s grant-in-aid
scholarship football players were statutory employees under the NLRA and directed
an election to take place on April 25, 2014. Northwestern Univ., Employer &
Collegiate Athletes Players Ass’n, 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837, 2014 WL 1246914
(Mar. 26, 2014). Another recent NLRB decision involving Columbia University
challenged the status of collegiate teaching students rather than student-athletes. Trs.
of Columbia Univ., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 90 (Aug. 23, 2016).
97. The NLRB dismissed the case on the basis “that asserting jurisdiction in
the case would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA to promote stability in
labor relations” and instead would create more instability by allowing studentathletes of private institutions to unionize, but prohibiting student-athletes of
public institutions from unionizing. Under the NLRA, only private employers are
allowed to join unions, meaning student-athletes of private universities would be
able to unionize, while student-athletes at public universities would be prohibited
from unionizing. Northwestern Univ., 2015 WL 4882656; Northwestern
University Decision, NLRB (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.nlrb.gov
/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node3034/Northwestern%20Fact%20
Sheet%202015-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB8R-7LWS].
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The Northwestern football team’s unionization attempt was not the
only time student-athletes were denied employment status.98 In addition to
rejecting the employee status of student-athletes under the NLRA, the
NCAA also maintains that student-athletes are not employees for purposes
of workers’ compensation.99 Even when a student-athlete has received an
athletic scholarship, courts find that such a student-athlete is not an
employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation because there is no
contractual employer–employee relationship.100
Likewise, courts have denied workers’ compensation benefits when a
student-athlete has signed a Letter of Intent and a Financial Aid
Agreement.101 Courts have held that the agreement to play a sport in
exchange for financial assistance does not constitute a contract for
employment;102 consequently, student-athletes do not receive workers’
compensation benefits.103

98. See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (1957);
Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000); Coleman
v. W. Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (1983).
99. See supra note 98.
100. See Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 698. Kent Waldrep, a football player at Texas
Christian University (“TCU”) was severely injured and paralyzed while playing
football. Id. Waldrep considered his injury a “work place accident,” filed for
workers’ compensation, and was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Id.
The Texas Employers Insurance Association, the workers’ compensation insurer,
appealed the award to the district court. Id. A jury concluded that Waldrep was
not an employee of TCU when he was injured and denied him workers’
compensation benefits. Id. See also Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444
N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983) (“Scholarship recipients are considered to be students
seeking advanced educational opportunities and are not considered to be
professional athletes, musicians or artists employed by the [u]niversity for their
skills in their respective areas.”).
101. Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 698. A National Letter of Intent is a letter a
student-athlete signs committing him to attend a NCAA Division I or II for one
academic year. See Recruiting, NCAA (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:17 PM), http://
www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/recruiting [https://perma.cc/JU4A-C6Y7].
A financial aid agreement is a scholarship agreement between a student-athlete
and an institution detailing the amount of scholarship and aid the student-athlete
will receive from the institution. Frequently Asked Questions about the NCAA,
NCAA (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:25 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-askedquestions-about-ncaa [https://perma.cc/9BT2-YUKR].
102. Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 700.
103. See generally id.
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B. Berger, Dawson, and the Compensation of Student Athletes Under the
FLSA
The lack of a concrete definition of employee under the FLSA creates
uncertainty, prompting challenges as to whether student-athletes are FLSA
employees and thus guaranteed the Act’s protections.104 Only two cases
have asserted claims against the NCAA under the FLSA: Berger v. NCAA
and Dawson v. NCAA.105 Berger and Dawson are the first cases
challenging student-athletes’ right to receive a minimum wage.106 In both
cases, the courts held that student-athletes do not qualify as employees and
thus cannot receive the benefits the FLSA provides.107 Despite the
consistent holdings, Berger and Dawson indicate that there may be
potential changes regarding the compensation of NCAA Division I
student-athletes by casting doubt on NCAA amateurism principles.108
1. Running to the Bank: Berger v. NCAA
In Berger, two female Division I track athletes from the University of
Pennsylvania brought suit against the NCAA, claiming that studentathletes are employees under the FLSA and thus entitled to minimum wage
and overtime pay.109 The student-athletes did not receive any athletic
scholarships because the University of Pennsylvania does not offer athletic
104. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern
American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46
UCLA L. REV. 983, 1005 (1999); see also Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 2:17-cv-04271-MMB, (E.D. Penn. 2017).
105. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir.
2016); Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
106. This Comment specifically focuses on the compensation of NCAA
Division I student-athletes. The recent litigation involving the compensation of
student-athletes has been brought solely by Division I student-athletes. Berger,
843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403. The pending appeal of Dawson
v. NCAA has the potential to qualify student-athletes as employees, contradicting
the prevailing view that student-athletes are generally not employees in any
context. See generally Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 401, 403.
107. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
108. Berger, 843 F.3d at 286; Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403.
109. The plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana seeking compensation based on the fact that their involvement
and time spent on their sport constituted work for the university, rendering them
employees and a right to be paid minimum wage and overtime. Berger, 843 F.3d
at 286.
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scholarships.110 After examining the totality of the circumstances, the
district court found that the student-athletes failed to establish an
employment relationship.111 Accordingly, the court dismissed the studentathletes’ petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that because
student-athletes are not employees, they are not entitled to the protections
of the FLSA.112
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, requesting the court to
use the factors the Second Circuit articulated to evaluate student-athletes’
status.113 The court reasoned that the Second Circuit intern “test” failed to
capture the relationship between the plaintiffs as student-athletes and the
university, as well as the NCAA’s tradition of amateurism.114 Rejecting
the application of the rigid test, the Seventh Circuit opted instead for a
more flexible approach.115 The court evaluated the economic reality of the
relationship between the student-athletes and the university, finding that
the evaluation of student-athletes as employees better encapsulates the
NCAA tradition of amateurism.116
110. The University of Pennsylvania is consistent with all other Ivy League
schools and does not offer athletic scholarships. Id. See also Vernon M. Strickland
& David J. Santeusanio, Court Rules That Student-Athletes are not Employees
Under the FLSA, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 8, 2010, 4:20 PM), https://www.lexology.com/
library/detail.aspx?g=7f18fe26-11cf-45bc-8b24-fdedbdae5f7e [https://perma.cc/
DY8H-KKCG].
111. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294.
112. Id. at 289.
113. Appellant Berger brought suit on behalf of herself and similarly situated
persons. The appellant in Berger likened interns to athletes and argued that the
factors should have been applied to determine whether student-athletes are
employees under the FLSA. Id. at 290 (citing Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures,
Inc., 811 F.3d 528, 536–37 (2d Cir. 2015)). See Glatt, 811 F.3d at 536–37 (listing
factors).
114. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (“The multifactor test . . . simply does not take
into account [the] tradition of amateurism or the reality of the student-athlete
experience.”).
115. Id.
116. Id. See also Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“Because status as an ‘employee’ for purposes of the FLSA depends on the
totality of circumstances rather than on any technical label, courts must examine
the ‘economic reality’ of the working relationship between the alleged employee
and the alleged employer to decide whether Congress intended the FLSA to apply
to that particular relationship.”). The Seventh Circuit followed the reasoning of
the district court and “followed the reasoning of Vanskike and held that the
‘factors used in the trainee and private-sector intern context fail to capture the
nature of the relationship between the Plaintiffs, as student-athletes and Penn.’”
Berger, 843 F.3d at 291 (citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808).
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The court also relied on persuasive authority from the DOL’s FOH,
which indicates that student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.117
College athletics are generally recognized as extra-curricular activities in
which participation is voluntary.118 According to the FOH, voluntary
participation in athletics does not constitute work, and therefore, studentathletes are not employees within the meaning of the FLSA.119
Additionally, the court looked to legal scholarship and jurisprudence
for guidance.120 A majority of the relevant cases held that student-athletes
are not employees.121 Primarily citing workers’ compensation cases, the
Seventh Circuit decided that student-athletes were not, and have not been,
recognized as employees within any employment context, let alone under
the FLSA.122 The court also agreed with the premise that legislation has
consistently failed to recognize student-athletes as employees under any
other employment statute.123

117. Berger, 843 F.3d at 291. The DOL FOH “is an operations manual that
provides Wage and Hour Division . . . investigators and staff with interpretations
of statutory provisions, procedures for conducting investigations, and general
administrative guidance.” Field Operations Handbook (FOH), U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
(Jan. 17, 2018, 2:33 PM), https://www.dol.gov/Whd/FOH/index.htm [https://per
ma.cc/P5GJ-X6V9]. The Seventh Circuit has cited the FOH as persuasive
authority several times. See Driver v. Apple Ill., LLC, 739 F.3d 1073, 1075 (7th
Cir. 2014); Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2007).
118. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292.
119. Id. at 293.
120. Id. at 291–92 (citing Epstein & Anderson, supra note 92, at 297
(collecting cases and concluding that “the courts have been consistent finding that
student athletes are not recognized as employees under any legal standard,
whether bringing claims under workers’ compensation laws, the NLRA or
FLSA”)).
121. Id. See also Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind.
1983); State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Indus. Comm’n, 314 P.2d 288 (1957); Waldrep
v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000); Coleman v. W. Mich.
Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (1983).
122. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292 (citing Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170); State
Comp. Ins. Fund, 314 P.2d at 288; Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 692; Coleman, 336
N.W.2d at 224. “Although two courts reached the opposite conclusion over fifty
years ago, they did so, at least in part, because the student athletes in those cases
were also separately employed by their universities.” Berger, 83 F.3d at 292
(citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Van Horn v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457 (1963)).
123. Berger, 843 F.3d at 292 (citing Rensing, 444 N.E.2d at 1170; State Comp.
Ins. Fund, 314 P.2d at 288; Waldrep, 21 S.W.3d at 692; Coleman, 336 N.W.2d at
224); see also Epstein & Anderson, supra note 92, at 297.
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The majority affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the case
and held as a matter of law that student-athletes have no legal basis for
FLSA claims.124 Basing its decision on the NCAA principles of
amateurism, the FOH, and the economic reality of student-athletes as
employees,125 the court concluded that “student-athletes’ ‘play’” is
completely voluntary and not the type of work necessary to trigger the
minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA.126 The longstanding tradition of amateurism “shows that student athletes—like all
amateur athletes—participate in their sports for reasons wholly unrelated
to immediate compensation,” and play knowing they will not be paid.127
2. Concurring but Creating Instability
Judge David Hamilton did not agree with the entirety of the Seventh
Circuit majority’s reasoning in Berger.128 In his concurrence, Judge
Hamilton recognized that the student-athletes were not employees under
the FLSA but specified that the same analysis does not necessarily apply
to all student-athletes.129 Judge Hamilton emphasized that Berger et al.
were non-scholarship athletes and were members of a non-revenuegenerating sport.130 Although the tradition of amateurism weighed in favor
of dismissal, Judge Hamilton suggested that amateurism may not result in
a dismissal of claims athletes of revenue-generating sports pursued.131
In revenue-generating sports such as football and men’s basketball,
Judge Hamilton continued, the economic reality should not always result
in dismissal of claims.132 Student-athletes in those sports are more
analogous to employees because their play is similar to employees who
“work” and produce revenue for a business.133 Football and basketball

124. Berger, 843 F.3d at 294.
125. Id. at 293.
126. Id. See supra note 30 (providing a definition of “work”).
127. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293.
128. Id. at 294 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 293.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally Marc Edelman, 21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are
Employees and Should be Allowed to Unionize, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:28 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/01/30/21-reasons-why-student
-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/#14b03e9c8d05 [htt
ps://perma.cc/XY8H-EUB6].
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generate billions of dollars in revenue for universities;134 yet studentathletes do not receive any of this revenue and are limited in the financial
assistance they may receive.135 Although he explained that “there may be
further room for debate” in cases addressing the employment status of
student-athletes, including the possibility of granting student-athlete’s
employment status, Judge Hamilton used the economic reality as a guide
to cast doubt on the employment status of student-athletes.136
3. Running with Judge Hamilton’s Concurrence: Dawson v. NCAA
As a result of Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Berger, Lamar
Dawson, a former NCAA Division I football player from University of
Southern California (“USC”), initiated a class-action lawsuit against the
Pacific-12 (“PAC-12”) Conference137 and the NCAA.138 Dawson alleged
violations of the FLSA and a state law equivalent.139 Dawson claimed
134. See generally Cork Gaines, The 25 Schools That Make the Most Money in
College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:20 AM), http://www.business
insider.com/college-sports-revenue-leaders-2015-9/#1-university-of-oregon--1960
-million-1 [https://perma.cc/SUC6-CHQU].
135. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (Hamilton, J., concurring). See Sheetz, supra note
3 (explaining the full cost of attendance). Division I student-athletes may receive
academic and athletic scholarship as well as a stipend through which the full cost
of attendance is awarded. See generally Scholarship, NCAA (Nov. 5, 2017, 9:25
PM), http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/scholarships [https://perma.cc
/4P8E-BFVA]. See also Cost of Attendance Q&A, NCAA (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:23 AM),
http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2015-09-03/cost-attendance-qa [https://per
ma.cc/2ZG3-EU6V].
136. Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (Hamilton, J., concurring).
137. The PAC-12 consists of a group of 12 universities that compete amongst
each other in intercollegiate athletics to decide a conference champion. About the
Pac-12 Conference, PAC-12 (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:46 AM), http://pac-12.com/content
/about-pac-12-conference [https://perma.cc/X2MJ-NTUN]. The conference must
be in compliance with NCAA regulations. Id. A member conference may set its
own rules, but those rules must also be in compliance with NCAA regulations. Id.
See also Member Conference, NCAA (Oct. 8, 2017, 9:47 AM), http://www.ncaa
.org/governance/membership [https://perma.cc/SCA3-HC9P].
138. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
139. Dawson’s class action suit was brought on behalf of an “FLSA Class” of
all “Division I FBS football players in the United States” and Dawson sought to
establish employee status under the FLSA for the entire class. Id. See also
Brandon Lilly, College Football Explained, GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2017, 7:52 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2012/oct/10/college-football-explained
-ncaa [https://perma.cc/3JQP-6NB7].
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denial of pay for hours worked and overtime pay as well as failure to
receive the appropriate minimum wage.140 Dawson further alleged that the
NCAA and PAC-12 were “joint employers” because the NCAA
established the rules governing student-athletes, and the PAC-12 adopted
and carried out the NCAA’s rules.141 Further, Dawson argued that he was
a member of a revenue-generating sport that earned “massive revenue” for
USC, differentiating him from the plaintiffs in Berger.142 Dawson relied
on Judge Hamilton’s Berger concurrence to support his argument that
athletes of revenue-generating sports, like USC football, are employees
under the FLSA.143 In response, the NCAA argued the student-athletes
lacked standing144 and asked the District Court of Northern California to
dismiss the suit, arguing that Dawson’s claim was based on an untenable
legal theory.145
The district court granted the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the suit and
held that the student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.146 The
court chose, however, not to apply the Ninth Circuit’s rigid test.147 Rather,
like the Seventh Circuit, the district court looked to the economic reality
of the relationship between student-athletes and the school.148 The court
held that it was unclear whether the NCAA or PAC-12 were employers
and also unclear whether student-athletes were employees;149 that is, the
four-factor test failed to provide an answer or assess the “true nature of the
relationship.”150 Analyzing the true nature of the relationship led the court
to consider NCAA amateurism when making its decision.151
The district court’s reasoning in Dawson mirrored that of Berger—the
court found the NCAA tradition of amateurism to be highly influential and
important.152 The court viewed participation in athletics as completely
140. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403.
141. Id. See also About the Pac-12 Conference, supra note 137; Member
Conference, supra note 137.
142. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 403. The Northern District of California sits in the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. See What Is the Ninth Circuit, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 3, 2018, 10:37 PM),
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/judicial_council/what_is_the_ninth_circuit.php [https:
//perma.cc/Z5A7-WE92].
149. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 403.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 405.
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voluntary without any expectation of earning an income, relying on the
FOH as persuasive authority.153 Dawson argued that Berger was
distinguishable because Berger’s claim involved athletes of non-revenuegenerating sports but Dawson’s claim involved Division I football players
who earned “massive revenues” for the school.154 Dawson heavily relied
on Judge Hamilton’s concurrence and the idea that Berger’s broad holding
should not necessarily extend to all student-athletes.155 Dawson further
cited a regional decision in Northwestern in which the Northwestern
University football players were determined to be employees under the
NLRA.156
Dawson argued that football should not fall into the “extracurricular
activities” excluded from coverage in the FOH because college athletes
play football for the economic benefit of the NCAA, which creates an
employment relationship.157 Dawson claimed that “revenue-generating
sports are like work-study programs” covered under the FLSA.158 After
distinguishing between “work-study programs, which exist for the benefit
of the school, and football programs, which exist for the benefit of students
and, in some limited circumstances, also benefit the school,” the district
court ultimately rejected Dawson’s argument.159 Relying on the FOH, the
court found that interscholastic activities are primarily an educational
opportunity provided to benefit participants and not the type of work that
results in an employment relationship the FLSA contemplates.160
Although Dawson argued that his generation of revenue for the school
distinguished him from the Berger plaintiffs, the district court refused to
accept generation of revenue as determinative of employment, thereby
rejecting Judge Hamilton’s suggestion.161 In examining the economic
153. Id. at 406. The DOL FOH provides that students who participate in
extracurricular activities are generally not employees under the FLSA. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Northwestern Univ., Employer & Collegiate Athletes Players
Ass’n, 198 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1837, 2014 WL 1246914 (Mar. 26, 2014)). The
NLRB ultimately chose not to assert jurisdiction over the Northwestern case and
did not decide if student-athletes were employees for unionization purposes.
Northwestern Univ., Employer & Collegiate Athletes Players Ass’n, 362
N.L.R.B. 167, 2015 WL 4882656 (Aug. 17, 2015).
157. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406. See Department of Labor Field
Operations Handbook, supra note 40 (explaining athletics are not covered as
extracurricular activities under the FLSA).
158. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 406.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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reality of the relationship between student-athletes and their schools,
courts have consistently rejected the relevance of profitability.162 The
district court determined that participation in intercollegiate athletics does
not constitute work and that there is no difference between sports that
generate money and those that do not.163
Ultimately, the district court held that Division I football players have
no legal basis to be considered employees under the FLSA and granted the
NCAA’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend.164 Although both the
Berger and Dawson courts determined that student-athletes are not
employees, the question remains as to whether certain athletes—
particularly those of revenue-generating sports—should be deemed
employees under the FLSA.165 Judge Hamilton’s concurrence in Berger
creates doubt regarding whether athletes should be employees.166 Judge
Hamilton failed to provide a test to determine the employment status of
student-athletes; rather, he proposed the idea that the employment
relationship is up for debate and should be based on the factual record of

162. Id. at 407 (citing Jochim v. Jean Madeline Educ. Ctr. of Cosmetology, 98
F. Supp. 3d 750, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2015)).
163. Id. at 407. Dawson further argued that the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon v.
NCAA characterized the relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes as
“labor for in-kind compensation” that established an employment relationship
under FLSA. Id. In O’Bannon v. NCAA, the plaintiffs brought an anti-trust suit
challenging the NCAA’s rules, banning players from receiving compensation for
the use of their name, image and likeness. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2015). Ed O’Bannon brought an anti-trust
lawsuit challenging the NCAA policy that prevents student-athletes from
receiving any money for the use of their names, images, and likenesses in video
games, promotional items, marketing etc. Id. The court in O’Bannon held that the
NCAA’s compensation rules were subject to anti-trust scrutiny and allowed for
student-athletes to be paid the full cost of attendance. Id. The Ninth Circuit held
that the NCAA compensation rules were subject to an anti-trust rule-of-reason
analysis, but did not address the determination of student-athletes as employees.
Id. The district court in Dawson relied on the fact that the O’Bannon opinion failed
to mention anything about the employment relationship of student-athletes and
the NCAA and found that Dawson failed to establish that the opinion had any
weight on student-athletes being classified as employees for FLSA purposes.
Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08.
164. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 408. Following the district court decision,
Dawson appealed to the Ninth Circuit. See Dawson v. NCAA, No. 17-15973 (9th
Cir. 2017).
165. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir.
2016) (Hamilton, J., concurring).
166. Id.
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the case at hand.167 Ambiguity surrounding this test led to the debate in
Dawson and will continue to prompt litigation if a court does not clarify
whether student-athletes are employees under the FLSA.168
III. APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC REALITY TEST TO NCAA DIVISION
I STUDENT-ATHLETES
The economic reality of a Division I student-athlete’s relationship
with his respective school results in the absence of an employer–employee
relationship and, consequently, the disqualification of the student-athlete
as an employee under the FLSA.169 Upon review of the DOL factors
assessing the economic reality and totality of the circumstances of the
employment relationship, the courts in Berger and Dawson were correct
in holding student-athletes are not employees.
The economic reality test provides a helpful analysis to determine
whether student-athletes should be given employee status and FLSA
protections.170 Using the DOL’s illustrative factors for economic reality, it
is clear that there is no employment relationship between a student-athlete
and his school, and student-athletes are not employees under the FLSA.171
A. The Permanency of the Relationship of Student-Athletes and Their
Respective Schools
The permanency and length of time one person works for another can
help determine the existence of an employment relationship.172 A longer
and more permanent relationship between a worker and employer suggests
existence of an employment relationship.173 A student-athlete is limited in

167. Id.
168. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 407–08; Jared Walch, Should athletes be
paid to play?, DAILY UTAH CHRON. (Oct. 12, 2017, 11:06 AM), http://college.usa
today.com/2016/10/20/should-athletes-be-paid-to-play/ [https://perma.cc/28EDG893].
169. This economic analysis focuses solely on Division I student-athletes of
revenue-generating sports. See generally Berger, 843 F.3d at 293 (7th Cir. 2016);
Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 407–08.
170. Dawson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 405.
171. Id. See supra Part I.A; see also Abrahams et al., supra note 27, at 240;
Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42. The factors listed determine if someone is an
employee or independent contractor for FLSA purposes. Id.
172. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
173. According to the DOL’s regulations, “[p]ermanency or indefiniteness in
the worker’s relationship with the employer suggests that the worker is an
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the amount of time he may compete for his institution and does not have a
permanent relationship with the university like an employee does.174
For example, Division I student-athletes may compete in four seasons
within five calendar years.175 If for some reason a student-athlete hits the
five-year mark and has not competed in four seasons, the athlete loses that
season of eligibility and can no longer compete.176 The relationship
between student-athletes and their schools expires after five years or upon
the exhaustion of their eligibility.177
This requirement results in a short-term relationship between a
student-athlete and his school, weighing against the existence of an
employment relationship.178 Although temporariness can be a product of
the industry in which a person is employed, the lack of a permanent
relationship between student-athletes and their schools supports the
conclusion that student-athletes are not employees.179
B. The Amount of the Worker’s Individual Investment in Facilities and
Equipment
A worker’s individual investment in facilities and equipment, such as
supplies and tools needed to complete a job, also aids in determining if a
worker is an independent contractor or, alternatively, an employee.180 If a
worker invests in materials or tools needed to perform a job, this generally
indicates that he is an independent contractor.181 According to the DOL,
“The worker [must] make some investment [compared to the employer’s
investment] (and therefore undertake at least some risk for a loss) in order
for there to be an indication that he or she is an independent [contractor
employee.” Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see also Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr.
Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1998).
174. See National Collegiate Athletic Association, Transfer Terms, NCAA
(Oct. 8, 2017, 1:23 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/current/transferterms [https://perma.cc/S84W-P7J2].
175. Although there are two other divisions—Division II and Division III—
this Comment focuses solely on Division I. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. The short nature of the relationship between student-athletes and their
schools suggests a lack of an employment relationship. See generally Fact Sheet
#13, supra note 42; see generally Baker, 137 F.3d at 1442.
179. See generally sources cited supra note 178.
180. See generally sources cited supra note 178.
181. See generally sources cited supra note 178. See also Chao v. Mid-Atl.
Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104, 107 (4th Cir. 2001).
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in] business [for himself or herself].”182 The fact that a worker makes an
investment into materials, however, does not itself render him an
independent contractor.183
Student-athletes generally make no personal monetary investment into
facilities or equipment needed to play or practice.184 The schools provide
shoes, clothing, and gear needed for competition to each student-athlete.185
In addition, student-athletes do not invest in the practice facilities, workout
rooms, or stadiums in which they train and compete.186
The limited amount of a student-athlete’s individual investment in
facilities and equipment weighs in favor of student-athletes being classified
as employees.187 Student-athletes do not have to personally invest like an
independent contractor must.188 Nonetheless, solely providing gear to
student-athletes does not create an employment relationship between the
athletes and their universities.189 Student-athletes are not provided an
employment contract, employment benefits, or other essential benefits
considered in assessing an employment relationship.190 A student-athlete’s
investment into facilities and equipment is not conclusive, and other factors
should be considered to determine whether an employment relationship
exists.

182. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see generally Chao, 16 F. App’x at 107.
183. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
184. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Bylaw 16.8 Expenses
Provided by the Institution for Practice and Competition, in NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL 209 (2017).
185. Id.
186. Id. Student-athletes should not have to invest in these items because they
do not receive any income with which they could contribute to defray equipment
costs. See generally Frequently Asked Questions about the NCAA, NCAA (Jan. 9,
2018, 10:02 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/frequently-asked-questions-aboutncaa [http://perma.cc/9BT2-YUKR].
187. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
188. See generally Matthew Kish, See what your university gets from Nike,
Adidas or Under Armour (Database), PORTLAND BUS. J. (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:14 AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2013/12/ databasenike-adidas-under-armour-ncaa.html [http://perma.cc/58JG-5HN7]; see also Scott
Cacciola, Shoes, Shirts, You Name It, College Basketball Players Get It. Free., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2018, 10:07 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/25/sports/ncaa
-march-madness-shoes-adidas-nike.html [https://perma.cc/UEX4-GFVU].
189. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
190. Charles J. Muhl, What Is an Employee? The Answer Depends on Federal
Law, U.S. DEP’T LAB. MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Nov. 10, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://www
.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2002/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG6-QMWA].
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C. The Opportunities for the Worker to Experience Profit and Loss
The opportunity for a person to experience—and have a direct impact
on—a business’s profits and losses, such the ability to make critical
business decisions, is a strong indication of an employment
relationship.191 The opportunity to experience profits and losses focuses
on “whether the worker exercises managerial skills and[, if so,] whether
those skills affect [that] worker’s opportunity for both profit and loss.”192
Student-athletes do not experience profits or losses. This factor, therefore,
weighs in favor of student-athletes being classified as independent
contractors and not employees.193
Student-athletes do not make critical business decisions for a
university athletic department and do not exercise any managerial control
as employees of the university.194 University presidents and athletic
directors make the business decisions that impact the profitability of an
athletic department.195 Although student-athletes may have an effect on
profits and losses based on their success on the field, student-athletes do
not make any direct business decisions that would be representative of an
employment relationship.196 As a result, student-athletes are more similar
to independent contractors than employees.
D. The Worker’s Skill and Initiative
An employee or independent contractor is hired based on his ability to
perform a job to a certain standard.197 Both independent contractors and
employees can be highly skilled.198 A worker is more likely to be classified
as an independent contractor when “the worker’s skills . . . demonstrate
191. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
192. Id. See also Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 810 (10th Cir. 1989).
193. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
194. See generally Jason Belzer, How Do Athletic Directors and University
Presidents Manage To Get Along?, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/01/26/how-do-athletic-directors-and-university
-presidents-manage-to-get-along/#3237567c3fbb [https://perma.cc/MEQ7-MSUH].
195. Id.
196. Id. See also Dole, 875 F.2d at 810.
197. See generally Susan Adams, The 10 Skills Employers Most Want In 20Something Employees, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2017, 3:37 PM), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/susanadams/2013/10/11/the-10-skills-employers-most-want-in-20something-employees/#3e4d6f286330 [https://perma.cc/R8ZM-8PF6]; see also
jurisprudence cited supra note 49.
198. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
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that he or she exercises independent business judgment.”199 A studentathlete is similar to an independent contractor because his skills and
specialization allow him to make “business judgements” and use his
talents as leverage when being recruited by schools.200 Like independent
contractors, universities seek out student-athletes for a unique set of
desirable skills.201 These skills give student-athletes the initiative to
operate similarly to an independent contractor whom a school “hires” for
his temporary duration and skill set.202 A more specialized athlete may
receive multiple offers to play and can choose to use his skills to benefit a
school that offers the best education and college experience.203 A highly
specialized athlete is similar to an independent contractor who can choose
with whom to do business.204 The high level of skill for which studentathletes are sought out thus weighs in favor of classifying student-athletes
as independent contractors.205
E. The Nature and Degree of Control by the Employer
An employer has a high degree of control over employees; he sets
hours, stipulates pay, and controls the manner in which the work is
performed.206 An independent contractor, in contrast, typically works
relatively free of employer control.207 Despite this general rule, an

199. Id.
200. See generally George Anders, How Student Athletes Get Full-Ride
Scholarships, FORBES (Oct. 8, 2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/georgeanders/2015/10/03/good-at-sports-experts-tell-how-2-of-teens-get-scholar
ships/#7d53c9e35b5d [https://perma.cc/DW6Z-VRBW].
201. Id. See also Herman v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., F. Supp. 2d 667
(D. Md. 2000).
202. See generally Anders, supra note 200.
203. See generally Michael Felder, A Behind-the-Scenes Look at How College
Football Coaches Recruit Players, BLEACHER REP. (Oct. 8, 2017, 3:50 PM),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1485807-a-behind-the-scenes-look-at-how-col
lege-football-coaches-recruit-players [https://perma.cc/A449-DT93].
204. In addition to athletic ability, coaches look to mental and physical
toughness, academic ability, coachability, and character. Id. See also Fact Sheet
#13, supra note 42.
205. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
206. Id. See also Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Constr. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1441
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff rig workers lacked independence over
hours, details of work, and other items that indicated an employment relationship,
not independent contractor status).
207. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
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employer can control an independent contractor to some extent.208 Though
college coaches wield great control over student-athletes and their
schedules, this alone does not render student-athletes’ employees.209
Control by the employer alone is not determinative of an employment
relationship.210
Because of the nature of collegiate athletics, college coaches have a
considerable amount of control over student-athletes.211 Although the
nature and degree of control weighs in favor of an employer–employee
relationship, it fails to encompass other important realities of a studentathlete’s relationship with his school.212 For example, student-athletes
attend school knowing that they will be subject to certain rules and control
by their coaches, such as mandatory study hall hours and training
sessions.213 Coaches dictate student-athletes’ day-to-day activities,
communicate where to be and when, and determine what needs to be
accomplished for the student-athlete to participate in his sport.214 Studentathletes, however, know that coaches’ control does not make them
employees of the school.215 Further, although there is a high level of
control of student-athletes, the control factor “does not hold any greater
weight then the other factors.”216 Other factors—such as the NCAA rules

208. Id.
209. Control is not a determinative factor of the employment relationship, just
one factor to consider in the assessment of the entire relationship. Id.
210. The DOL explains that this factor alone does not indicate employment
and does not have more weight than any of the other factors. Id. Control is a factor
that must be balanced along with the other factors. Id.
211. Under NCAA Bylaw 11.1.1.1 college coaches are responsible for ensuring
that student-athletes, assistant coaches, and staff members are not violating NCAA
rules, and therefore have a large amount of control over what happens in their
individual programs. Responsibilities of Division I Head Coaches, NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018DIEnf_HeadCoachResponsibilites_2
0180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KNP-QLRQ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019). See also
Ian Crouch, Are College Athletes Employees?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2014),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/sporting-scene/are-college-athletes-employees
[https://perma.cc/BFL5-FMU8].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Division I Time Demands Study Summary of Findings, NCAA (Nov. 10,
2017, 4:06 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2016RES_DI-TimeDemands-Summary_20160506.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KXQ-3RV4].
215. Crouch, supra note 211; see generally Epstein & Anderson, supra note
92, at 294.
216. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
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and regulations—must be considered when determining the employment
status of student-athletes.217
F. The Extent to Which the Work Performed is an Integral Part of the
Employer’s Business
The importance of an individual’s work to the success of a business
can impact whether that individual is an employee or an independent
contractor.218 A person is more likely to be considered an employee of a
business when their work is integral and vital to the success of the
business. Work is considered integral if the business’s success depends on
the completion of the work.219 Although student-athletes provide a
service—entertainment—the overarching goal of a university athletic
department is to uphold the university’s commitment to education.220
Athletic departments differ from general businesses in that their first
priority is not to turn a profit, but rather to provide student-athletes with a
quality educational experience that prepares them for life after college.221
217. Id. See also Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (10th Cir. 1989) (explaining
that one factor alone is not dipositive of an employment relationship). See
generally John Niemeyer, The End of an Era: The Mounting Challenges to the
NCAA’s Model of Amateurism, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 883, 887 (2015).
218. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42; see also Sec’y of Labor, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1537 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that picking
pickles is an integral part to the pickle picking business and vital to the success of
the business).
219. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
220. See generally Jason Belzer, How Do Athletic Directors and University
Presidents Manage to Get Along?, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/01/26/how-do-athletic-directors-and-university
-presidents-manage-to-get-along/#3237567c3fbb [http://perma.cc/MEQ7-MSUH]
(nothing that university presidents and athletic directors work together and make
decisions to benefit the overall mission of the University); see generally Mission
Statement for Athletics at Duke, DUKE U., http://www.goduke.com/ViewArticle
.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=4200&ATCLID=152723 [https://perma.cc/58V9-FPW4]
(last visited Feb. 7, 2019); see also Grizzly Policies and Procedures, U. MONT.,
http://www.umt.edu/self-study2010/std3/Std3Exhibits/RE3-01/AthleticsManualMissionandPhilosophy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3UK-J88R] (last visited Feb. 7,
2019); see also MSU Athletics Department Mission Statement and Core Values,
MICH. ST. U., https://msu.edu/~msuncaa/mission.html [https://perma.cc/NX5GWTZJ] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
221. See generally Lindsay J. Rosenthal, From Regulating Organization to
Multi-Billion Dollar Business: The NCAA Is Commercializing the Amateur
Competition It Has Taken Almost a Century to Create, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT
L. 321 (2003). “The purpose of the [NCAA] . . . is to maintain intercollegiate
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Student-athletes’ “work” is not vital to the mission and overall success of
the university because it does not further the university’s commitment to
education.222
Student-athletes’ work is not an integral part of the university business
model, and therefore, student-athletes should be classified as “independent
contractors.”223 Student-athletes’ work product is not the main service
universities set out to provide.224 Rather, universities focus is on providing
students a quality education.225 Participation in collegiate athletics is an added
benefit students may enjoy, but it is not the main service that universities were
established to provide.226 The overall analysis of the economic reality of the
relationship between student-athletes and their schools compares studentathletes more similarly to independent contractors than employees.
G. Other Factors Necessary to Assess the Economic Reality
Courts must evaluate the totality of circumstances of the working
relationship; all facts relative “to the total activity or situation” must be
considered when determining if student-athletes are employees.227
Although the analysis of the economic reality factors help classify studentathletes, other factors remain that should be addressed to clearly establish
the presence of an employment relationship. The factors the DOL provide
do not fully capture the relationship between student-athletes and their
schools.228 The factors fail to take into consideration that the NCAA
stipulates that student-athletes are not employees.229 The longstanding
principle of amateurism, which requires that student-athletes may not
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” Id.
222. Id.
223. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
224. See generally Eric T. Vanoever & Michael M. DeBowes, The Impact of
Intercollegiate Athletics in Higher Education, 1 HIGHER EDUC. POLS. & ECON.
44-6 (2013).
225. Rosenthal, supra note 221, at 343.
226. Id. See also Belzer, supra note 220 (explaining that university presidents
and athletic directors want to stay competitive in all aspects of the university
including education and academics).
227. Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
228. The factors fail to take into consideration the impact of amateurism, the
NCAA’s express provision that student-athletes are not employees, the economic
feasibility of student-athletes as employees, and other important factors. See
generally Niemeyer, supra note 217, at 887.
229. See generally id.
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receive any type of compensation and will be deemed ineligible to play if
they violate this rule, supports the NCAA’s stance that student-athletes are
not employees.230 Taking this principle into consideration would represent
a clearer picture of the totality of the circumstances when analyzing
whether student-athletes are actually employees.231 The fact that the
NCAA prohibits student-athletes from being paid as employees indicates
that there is no employment relationship between the employer and
student-athlete.232 Collegiate student-athletes voluntarily commit to play
sports without any expectation of payment and understand they are not
signing an employment contract with the university.233
The economic reality of paying all Division I student-athletes
minimum wage and overtime is something that many schools would not
be able to financially manage,234 which is a relevant factor to address when
determining the employment status of student-athletes. Looking at other
factors beyond those the DOL suggests, such as the financial difficulties
and the determination of whom gets paid and for what type of work, the
economic realty and totality-of-circumstances tests confirm that studentathletes are not employees.235
IV. DEAL OR NO DEAL: PERMIT STUDENT-ATHLETES TO PURSUE
ENDORSEMENT DEALS
The totality of circumstances makes clear that student athletes are not
employees; this does not mean, however, that student-athletes should not
receive compensation. In addition to the increased costs of compensation,
classifying student-athletes as employees would lead to an increase in
litigation.236 To reduce the amount of litigation regarding the compensation
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. If an employee is covered under the FLSA, an employer must pay that
employee at least the federal minimum wage and no less. Fact Sheet #70:
Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Furloughs and Other Reductions in Pay
and Hours Worked Issues, U.S. DEP’T LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIVISION (Nov. 2009),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs70.pdf [https://perma.cc/E57GJ2WR].
233. Niemeyer, supra note 217, at 887.
234. See generally Ryan McCready, Can Schools Actually Support Paying
College Athletes? It’s Complicated, VENNGAGE (Sept. 13, 2016), https://venn
gage.com/blog/paying-college-athletes/ [https://perma.cc/3AKP-V6S4].
235. See generally Fact Sheet #13, supra note 42.
236. In 2013, 25 Division I schools operated with a budget deficit. Id. Paying
every Division I student-athlete would amount to almost $51,040,000 per week—
176,000 athletes at $7.25 an hour. Sheetz, supra note 3, at 884. This figure does
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of student-athletes, a solution needs to be reached that is acceptable to all
parties. This solution should clarify that student-athletes are not employees
under the FLSA but are still able to receive some type of compensation.
There are a few ways to accomplish this goal, such as amending the FLSA
and providing athletes with trusts to access after graduation.237 Ultimately,
the best way to limit litigation over student-athlete compensation is to allow
student-athletes to receive endorsement deals and generate their own
personal income.238
A. Amend the FLSA and Develop a Concrete Definition and Test to
Determine Who Qualifies as an FLSA Employee
One possible way to compensate student-athletes is to amend the
definition of employee under the FLSA. The FLSA definition is circular
and fails to provide guidance to courts as to whom exactly should receive
employment status under the statute.239 The statute describes an employee
as anyone an employer employs;240 this broad definition provides little
guidance as to what it means to be an employee.241 If the definition is
refined to an enumerated test,242 it would be easier to determine if studentathletes are included as employees and thus may receive the protections of
the FLSA. Federal appellate courts have developed their own tests to apply
not include the full cost of attendance schools may award. Id. Many schools would
not be able to afford the cost of paying student-athletes as employees. McCready,
supra note 234. Paying student-athletes could create further problems because
institutions would have to potentially funnel money that would otherwise be used
on academic endeavors to supplement the cost to pay student-athletes minimum
wage. Id. See also Jenkins v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 14-cv-02758CW (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014); Livers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2:17-cv04271-MMB (E.D. Penn. 2017); Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843
F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016); Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F.
Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Daniel L. Fulk, Revenues and Expenses
2004-2014, NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT
8 (2015), http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2015%20Division%20I%20RE
%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3QQ-7E5D].
237. See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
238. See generally Corgan, supra note 21, at 420.
239. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012) (defining employee as “any individual
employed by an employer”).
240. Id.
241. Goldstein et al., supra note 104, at 1005 (describing the circular definition
of employee under the FLSA).
242. The Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit have developed such enumerated
tests. See supra Part I.A.
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when deciding whether an individual is an employee.243 Providing a
concrete test for all circuits to follow would create consistency and reduce
the amount of litigation because student-athletes would know whether the
FLSA protects them, regardless of where they file suit.
Although amending the FLSA is a potential solution, Congress
intentionally created a broad definition of employee because it was
“necessary to effectuate its humanitarian goals.”244 The broad definition of
employee does not limit coverage to a specific working relationship or
specific people; rather, it includes many different employment relationships
and provides rights to those deemed not to have an employment relationship
prior to the enactment of the FLSA.245
Amending the FLSA is an impracticable solution to decrease the
amount of ligation involving the compensation of student-athletes without
recognizing them as employees.246 Redefining “employee” under the
FLSA would not provide the necessary relief within an efficient time
period. Because the FLSA is a federal statute, Congress must make any
amendments.247 The likelihood that Congress will take the time to amend
the Act to clarify whether student-athletes are employees is unrealistic and
impracticable.248 Arguably, an amendment to the FLSA could best solve
the problem but is impracticable.
243. Goldstein et al., supra note 104, at 1010. For example, the Eleventh
Circuit has eight factors it applies when determining who is an employee, but the
Ninth Circuit has a four-factor test. Bonnette v. Cal. Health & Welfare Agency,
704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983). See also supra Part I.A for the Second Circuit and
Seventh Circuit tests.
244. Richard J. Burch, A Practitioner’s Guide to Joint Employer Liability
Under the FLSA, 2 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 393, 400 (2002).
245. Id. The goal of the FLSA was to eliminate substandard working
conditions; limiting the definition of employee would not further the goal of
promoting improved working conditions because it would create concrete barriers
to who is covered as a FLSA employee with no fluidity for change. H.R. 913, 93th
Cong. (1974) (noting the expansive scope of the Act was vital to the goal of
eliminating substandard working conditions).
246. See generally Burch, supra note 244, at 400 (noting the definition of
employee was left intentionally board to leave room for interpretation).
247. Abrahams et al., supra note 27, at 110.
248. As it has been nine years since Congress amended the FLSA, it is
impractical to think Congress will take the time to do this, especially when they
have other pressing matters. See generally Julia Horowitz, It’s been 10 years
since Congress raised the minimum wage, CNN MONEY (May 25, 2017), http://
money.cnn.com/2017/05/25/news/economy/minimum-wage-bill-democrats/
index.html [https://perma.cc/8CBK-55WZ]; see also Tiffany Kobel, 7 Facts
About the Minimum Wage, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 25, 2016), https://obama
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B. Establish Trusts for Student-Athletes to Access After Graduation and
the Exhaustion of Eligibility
Another possible solution to help compensate student-athletes to some
degree is to create trusts for student-athletes. The trusts would provide
additional monetary awards, above any scholarships a student-athlete may
receive, after the completion of college or the exhaustion of eligibility, and
help financially support a student-athlete. Creating trusts for studentathletes from which to draw after college would be a reasonable
amendment to the NCAA rules of amateurism barring the compensation
of student-athletes.249 Creating trusts was a solution the court proposed in
O’Bannon v. NCAA; the district court found that this “would . . . enable
the NCAA to achieve its goals in a less restrictive manner, provided the
compensation was limited and distributed equally among team
members.”250 Establishing trusts creates a balance that does not completely
eradicate the principle of amateurism.
Trusts, however, present the same type of financial problems
associated with student-athletes’ payment as employees.251 In O’Bannon,
the plaintiff sought the payment of trusts up to $5,000 per year, for four
years, for a total of $20,000.252 If universities paid every Division I
student-athlete $5,000 per year, it would result in a total of $880,000 a
year or $3.5 million every four years.253 Considering how few athletic
departments generate a profit, these trusts would be very difficult for
schools to fund directly from athletic revenue.254 Student-athlete
compensation would have to come from outside funds, such as the
institutions’ general fund, which is an infeasible solution to the problem.255
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/07/25/7-facts-about-minimum-wage [https://
perma.cc/B673-HYPA].
249. John T. Wolohan, What Is Reasonable: Are the NCAA’s Restraints on
Athlete Compensation Reasonable?, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 515, 539 (2017)
(citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2014)).
250. Id.; see also supra Part III.B; supra note 163 (explaining O’Bannon v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)).
251. McCready, supra note 234 (explaining the costs associated with paying
student athletes).
252. Wolohan, supra note 249, at 539 (citing O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983).
253. This number was calculated by multiplying $5,000 times the total number
of student-athletes, 176,000, to calculate a per year rate, and a four-year rate.
254. See generally Cork Gaines, The 25 Schools That Make the Most Money
in College Sports, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.businessinsider
.com/college-sports-revenue-leaders-2015-9 [http://perma.cc/SUC6-CHQU].
255. Universities already face many tough budgetary choices and restrictions,
and would have to cut programs to afford paying student-athletes from the general
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The Ninth Circuit rejected O’Bannon’s proposal to create trusts,
finding that the NCAA would have to completely surrender its amateurism
principles and turn a “unique brand of sport into a minor league”; the
college sports that we know would no longer exist.256 If the trusts were
“untethered to education” and the money had to be used to attend graduate
school or some type of post-secondary education, the trust solution could
work.257 But the financial ability of schools to pay all student-athletes’
trusts is economically infeasible.258 Instituting trusts could help with some
alterations, but it is not the best solution to limit the ligation connected to
the compensation of student-athletes because of the financial difficulties it
would present universities.
C. Amend the NCAA Amateurism Policy and Allow Student-Athletes to
Receive Endorsements
The third and most sensible solution to the issue of compensation is to
allow student-athletes to pursue their own endorsement deals and revenue.
Allowing student-athletes to profit as “self-employees” is the most
practical solution because it does not completely abolish NCAA
amateurism principles and provides compensation to student-athletes for
their athletic endeavors.259 “[P]aying [student] athletes a substantial formal
salary for their play” clearly conflicts with the NCAA principle of
amateurism.260 Allowing student-athletes to profit on their own, however,
does not require schools to pay athletes a formal salary; rather, allowing
student-athletes to be “self-employed” authorizes athletes to generate their
own sources of income.261 This solution permits a student-athlete to play
for his own success—rather than purely for the success of the team—
fund. Matt Krupnick, Would Your Tuition Bills Go Up If College Athletes Got
Paid?, TIME MAG. (Nov. 28, 2014), http://time.com/money/3605591/collegeathletes-sports-costs-students/ [https://perma.cc/B5PV-C852].
256. Wolohan, supra note 249, at 545.
257. Sheetz, supra note 3, at 876.
258. Fulk, supra note 236 (reporting Division I athletic department revenues
for the 2014 Fiscal Year and the few schools that turn a profit from athletic
endeavors).
259. In this context, the term “self-employee” is someone who is selfemployed and does not work for an employer. This is someone who is a soleproprietor and earns an income based on his own personal work and endeavors.
See generally Self-Employed, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/term
s/s/self-employed.asp [https://perma.cc/R9R3-65D2] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
260. Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of
Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 579 (2009) (emphasis added).
261. Corgan, supra note 21, at 417.
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because he is compensated based on his own individual talent.262 Allowing
student-athletes to profit on their own would require member institutions’
amendment to the NCAA amateurism policy.263
1. Compensation Based Directly on Athletic Abilities and Personal
Success
If the NCAA allows student-athletes to profit on their own and receive
money from other outside revenue sources, the money earned would be
based directly on their own athletic abilities.264 As a result, universities
would not face the issues of funding the payment of athletes as employees
and determining whom the school should pay.265 Which students the
school would compensate would depend solely on the performance of the
individual athlete, removing the school from the decision.
Student-athletes would be technically “self-employed” and earn their
own money.266 The amount earned would be based on how successful the
athlete is in the personal performance of his sport. As “self-employees,”
student-athletes would be similar to individual business owners making
profits for products they produce; student-athletes’ performances would
be services they offer as self-employees. Amending the NCAA’s amateur
policy to allow this practice would provide a middle ground between
student-athletes as employees and prohibiting student-athletes from
profiting at all.267
2. Eliminating the Difficulty
Determining whom the school pays, how much, and for how many
hours would result in many administrative issues for university athletic
departments.268 Trying to determine whether only athletes of revenuegenerating sports are employees and what activities count as “work” could

262. Id.
263. Division I Governance, supra note 13.
264. The revenue earned would be based on a student-athlete’s individual
athletic abilities because the endorsement deals would be based on the athlete’s
performance on the field. See generally Corgan, supra note 21, at 417.
265. See generally Gary Parrish, Everybody Wins if the NCAA Allows Players
to Accept Endorsements, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.cbssports
.com/college-basketball/news/everybody-wins-if-the-ncaa-will-allow-players-toaccept-endorsements/ [https://perma.cc/K8EB-MRQA].
266. Corgan, supra note 21, at 420.
267. Id.
268. See generally id. at 418.
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lead to many other subsequent problems, including lawsuits for unequal
pay or Title IX violations.269
Football and men’s basketball are typically the only sports that
generate revenue for an athletic department.270 Within each team, some
players influence more fans to attend games because of their athletic
abilities and the excitement generated when watching them play.
Theoretically, it would make sense to pay these players more than other
players.271 Determining which players most positively influence
attendance, sell the most jerseys, and cause the most season tickets to be
sold would be very difficult for a collegiate athletic department to
evaluate.272 Further, paying some players more than others is not a viable
solution because it would not support team unity,273 could result in few
athletes receiving compensation, and could cause problems with providing
equal opportunities to female athletes.274
3. Complying with Title IX
In addition to eliminating the problems associated with determining
which student-athletes to pay, allowing students to pursue their own
endorsement deals would eliminate the problems associated with Title IX
compliance.275 Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972
protects individuals from being discriminated against on the basis of sex
269. Title IX states, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see also Anderson, supra note 18,
at 326.
270. See Gaines, supra note 134.
271. See generally Joe Nocera, A Way to Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/09/sports/a-way-tostart-paying-college-athletes.html [https://perma.cc/2ZRC-SFCS].
272. Id. (explaining how student-athletes of revenue-generating sports play a
different role on campus than other student-athletes and how only paying athletes
of revenue-generating sports is a concept that most likely would have to be
litigated).
273. Allowing student-athletes to receive their own endorsements would not
present the same issues stemming from a school paying student-athletes directly
based on their performance on the field. Revenue from endorsements would come
from outside third parties, not the school favoring certain athletes over others.
Corgan, supra note 21, at 420.
274. Title IX is still an issue that would need to be addressed when paying only
athletes of revenue-generating sports. Id.
275. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
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in any activity receiving federal funding.276 To receive federal funding, all
schools must be in compliance with Title IX.277 To comply, an institution
must provide equal opportunities and funding to members of both sexes.278
If student-athletes of Division I revenue-generating sports are employees
under the FLSA, schools will be burdened with complying with Title IX
because men’s sports, such as football and basketball, typically are the
only sports that generate revenue for a school.279
Paying student-athletes as “self-employees” allows student-athletes to
be paid at “the fair market value of their services” and does not violate
Title IX.280 Because the compensation comes from private individuals and
businesses, not directly from the institution, there is no requirement to
award males and females equal funding.281 If a player is very talented, he
or she has an equal opportunity to profit and receive endorsement deals
based on his or her athletic abilities, regardless of gender.282 Selfemployment of student-athletes would generate opportunities for both

276. Id.; see also Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. (Apr.
2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma
.cc/A729-ZYEW]. To ensure the growth of opportunities for women, the Office of
Civil Rights (“OCR”) requires that all universities that receive federal funding be in
compliance with Title IX and continue to provide equal opportunities and financial
assistance to all genders. Id. If schools fail to provide equal funding to both males
and females, OCR may remove an institution’s federal funding for violations.
Anderson, supra note 18, at 342.
277. Anderson, supra note 18, at 326.
278. Id.
279. Paying athletes that participate in revenue-generating sports would result in
unequal funding to male and female athletes. See generally Jane McManus,
Pressure to pay student-athletes carries question of Title IX, ESPN (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://www.espn.com/espnw/culture/feature/article/15201865/pressure-pay-stud
ent-athletes-carries-question-title-ix [https://perma.cc/82VU-CZ7X]; see also
Gaines, supra note 134. Women’s sports rarely generate revenue for a university.
280. Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College
Basketball, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 885 (2002).
281. There is no concern regarding equal pay to both males and females
because there are no federal ties to the money. This eliminates concerns of Title
IX compliance. See generally Corgan, supra note 21, at 417; see also Edelman,
supra note 280, at 885. Athletes could receive endorsement deals from companies
such as Nike, Under Armour, Gatorade, and McDonald’s. See generally 5
Olympic Athletes with Insanely Big Endorsement Deals, TIME MAG. (Aug. 19,
2016), http://time.com/money/4459824/2016-rio-olympics-endorsement-deals/
[https://perma.cc/9REV-794H].
282. Corgan, supra note 21, at 417.
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males and females to seek their own endorsement deals on an equal
playing ground.283
Allowing student-athletes to seek endorsements allows both men and
women to pursue opportunities based on their own personal athletic
performance. Additionally, it may provide an opportunity for women to
make money that they may not have had otherwise.284 Professional female
athletes have proven they are marketable and can receive endorsement deals
like professional male athletes.285 Like their professional counterparts,
female collegiate athletes could take advantage of this opportunity to pursue
their own endorsement deals, receiving compensation in the process.
Permitting all athletes to profit on their own would relieve schools from the
challenges of paying athletes and compliance with Title IX and provide all
student-athletes with the opportunity to generate money, not just those in
revenue-generating sports.
4. Student-Athletes Unable to Generate Income to Support
Themselves
Because of their demanding schedules, student-athletes are not able to
hold jobs like other students.286 Permitting student-athletes to receive
endorsements would allow student-athletes to generate income needed to
support themselves during and after college. Some student-athletes are
financially unstable and incapable of working because of their demanding
schedules.287 For example, NCAA Division I football players “dedicate an
average of 43.3 hours per week to their sport.”288 They do not have enough
time to work a job, go to school, and participate in a Division I sport.289
Football players at Division I schools who receive a cost of attendance
stipend often use that money to pay for groceries, rent, car repairs, and

283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Chris Isidore, Playing college sports: A long, tough job, CNN MONEY
(May 31, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/31/news/companies/collegeathletes-jobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/AVF2-LB2D].
287. See generally Ray Glier, Pets, Car Repairs and Mom: How College
Football Players use their Stipends, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/sports/ncaafootball/pets-car-repairs-and-mom-how-foot
ball-players-use-their-stipends.html [https://perma.cc/ZUP4-UHRY].
288. Michael S. McLeran, Playing for Peanuts: Determining Fair
Compensation for NCAA Student-Athletes, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 285 (2017).
289. Division I football players spend “an average of 36 hours a week” on their
sport. Isidore, supra note 286.
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even send money home to support families.290 Most of the reported uses
of the stipends are spent on basic and essential expenses needed to live.291
Through endorsement deals, student-athletes could earn income they
otherwise would not be able to generate.292 All other students who attend
college have the opportunity for employment and generate income;
student-athletes should not be denied the same opportunity.293
Student-athletes should not be limited in their efforts to make money to
financially support themselves. Most student-athletes attend college with
hopes of playing professionally, but the reality is that many do not and
instead leave college without any financial means to support themselves.294
The NCAA estimates that only 1.5% of college football players and 1.1%
of college basketball players will play professionally.295 Many athletes who
do not play professionally have a hard time adjusting to life after college
because all they have known for four-to-five years is the daily activities
required of the sport.296 The post-college adjustment can involve depression,
financial difficulties, and other serious problems.297 The majority of players
receive a degree and are able to get a job after college, but others leave
college with no job and no financial means to support themselves.298 Selfemployment of student-athletes would help reduce the number of students
who leave school without financial support. Granting student-athletes the
ability to be “self-employed” and receive endorsement deals provides a
practical and rational means for allowing student-athletes to receive some
type of compensation without completely destroying NCAA amateurism.299
290. Glier, supra note 287.
291. Id.
292. Corgan, supra note 21, at 418.
293. See generally Isidore, supra note 286.
294. Patrick Gleeson, The Likelihood of Someone Becoming a Professional
Sports Player, CHRON (June 27, 2018), http://work.chron.com/likelihood-someonebecoming-professional-sports-player-26110.html [https://perma.cc/Y4 XQ-4CFL].
295. Estimated probability of competing in professional athletics, NCAA, http://
www.ncaa.org/about/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-profession
al-athletics [https://perma.cc/M7S5-KQ8B] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019).
296. See Interview with Ramogi Huma, Founder of the National College Players
Association (explaining how hard the transition is for some student-athletes and the
problems experienced post college); Paul Soloman, Is the NCAA failing its college
athletes?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Mar. 21, 2016), http://www.pbs .org/newshour/makingsense/is-the-ncaa-failing-its-college-athletes/ [https://perma .cc/6UJX-5N2K].
297. Soloman, supra note 296.
298. Id.
299. There are technical details that legislators would need to explore for this
solution to work efficiently, including: limiting how many endorsements a player
can receive, when he is able to start receiving endorsements, and what types of
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CONCLUSION
Berger and Dawson have created uncertainty in classifying studentathletes as employees under the FLSA.300 Allowing student-athletes to be
employees would produce many negative consequences member
institutions would not be equipped to handle, such as financial challenges
and difficulties in complying with Title IX.301 Collegiate athletics would
not be able to operate in the same way that it has for years, and total reform
would be required.302 Although student-athletes should not be classified as
employees under the FLSA, they should be able to make money on their
own through endorsements and outside revenue sources. Allowing
student-athletes to do so would provide an equal opportunity to all studentathletes to produce their own revenue based on personal athletic
endeavors. Modifying the NCAA amateurism rules to accommodate “selfemployment” creates a solution that is attractive to the NCAA, member
institutions, and student-athletes. The litigation involving the
compensation of student athletes indicates the need for change within the
NCAA legislation and governance of Division I athletics.303 The NCAA
must modernize its amateurism bylaws and adapt to the collegiate model
so that players are compensated for their athletic endeavors.
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endorsements he can accept. For example, only allowing an athlete to receive
money once he commits to an institution would help with the recruiting concerns
that could arise when giving certain athletes endorsements to attend a certain
school. In addition, limiting the amount of endorsements students-athletes may
receive would help to make sure that student-athletes do not shift too much of
their focus away from the classroom and toward the playing field. Parrish, supra
note 265.
300. Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir.
2016); Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 403 (N.D.
Cal. 2017).
301. See generally Kristi Dosh, The Problems with Paying Student Athletes,
FORBES (June 9, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/06/09/
the-problems-with-paying-college-athletes/2/#738a79976d97 [https://perma.cc/E
T4N-PNAW].
302. Id.
303. “Litigation surrounding compensation of student-athletes is indicative of
the need for a change in the governance of the NCAA, rather than for a complete
change of the entire college sports industry.” Sheetz, supra note 3, at 893.
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